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Chapter Ten
Just War and the Indian Tradition
Arguments from the Battlefield
Shyam Ranganathan
INTRODUCTION
Jeff McMahan in his remarkable Killing in War1 draws a distinction between
two senses of “war.” In the first sense, war stands for a conflict between
opposing parties. In the second sense, war is party relative, and some side
may have a right of war (jus ad bellum), whereas others lack justification for
war. In this sense, some parties fight a just war, whereas others fight an
unjust war. According to McMahan, there is no radical difference between
the moral considerations that operate outside of war and in war; the same
moral considerations apply in both cases. Those who violate moral consider-
ations fight an unjust war, whereas those who do not violate moral considera-
tions fight a just war. Whereas Michael Walzer defended the idea that there is
a logical independence between the considerations that justify going to war
and the considerations pertaining to just conduct in war2—and the related
idea that there is a moral equality among combatants such that fighting for
the wrong side does not entail wrongdoing in the conduct of war—he argues
that one’s conduct in war does not count as just (jus in bello) if one fights for
the wrong side and that one has no right to fight those whose cause is just.
The premise that produces McMahan’s powerful conclusions is that war
does not create a new set of moral standards; they are the same standards in
peace and war that allow us to distinguish those whose cause and conduct in
war are just and those whose cause and conduct are not just. If this is true,
then fighting a just war would entail no need to get one’s hands dirty—a
requirement that Michael Walzer claimed earlier arises from the expedience
of war and, later, only in cases of extreme emergency.3
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While there are many notable contributions to just war theory from the
Indian tradition, in this chapter I will consider what may be the most famous
argument for just war defended in the Bhagavad Gītā (where the philoso-
pher–deity Krishna provides an extended pep talk on just war and moral
theory to his cousin Arjuna on the battlefield before the commencement of
war) and implicitly explored in the wider epic from which it is from, the
Mahābhārata.4 This epic about a fratricidal war provides grounds for reject-
ing the idea that the justice of a war is elucidated by the fidelity of combat-
ants to conventional standards of morality. Rather, the need for war arises
from a breakdown of conventional morality, which identifies ethical consid-
erations with the good. Such conventional moral considerations break down
when they provide shelter for parties who endorse conventional morality as a
weapon to undermine the conventionally moral, the conventionally moral
whose cause is prima facie just must hence depart from conventional moral-
ity to rid themselves of this hostility and reset the moral order. Yet, according
to the alternative moral paradigm that resets the moral order, the Gītā entails
that we can agree with McMahan: the side of those whose cause is just have a
right to fight, and those whose cause is unjust have no such right and do
wrong by engaging in conflict. Those who fight for a just cause do not get
their hands dirty by way of transcendent conditions of justice, though they
get their hands dirty by conventional moral expectations. The point of con-
vergence between the argument from the Gītā and McMahan is noteworthy,
as is their divergence.
For McMahan, the conditions in war make no difference to what morality
permits and that the justifications for killing people are the same in war as
they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defense. On the approach
we find in the Gītā, the conditions of just war, namely, the breakdown of
conventional morality to mediate competing interests fairly by its conversion
into a tool of oppressing the good by the wicked, entails that certain activities
may be unjustified in peacetime, though just in war, if undertaken by those
whose cause is just. Such activities could include proactive killing, including
the killing of noncombatants providing material or emotional support to the
unjust (which would not be allowed by conventional standards of self-de-
fense); deceit; and the breaking of promises. I would suggest that this diver-
gence is instructive and that the scenarios that we find discussed in the
Mahābhārata that led to Krishna’s advocating the radical departure from
conventional morality should be taken seriously. In the Western tradition, it
is difficult to think of arguments that highlight how conventional morality
could be a tool of oppression. Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals is an excep-
tion, wherein he argues that conventional morals are the values of slaves,
conditioned by a context of oppression, and that the alternative is an ethics of
the aristocratic self. Nietzsche himself showed an interest in Indian philoso-
phy, and many of his ideas, such as the notion of eternal return and the
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superman Übermensch, who transcends the ordinary, have obvious Indian
roots.5 Indeed, the argument from the Genealogy also seems like a caricature
of the argument in the Gītā. The main difference is that Krishna’s argument
in contrast does not require that we throw the baby out with the bath water;
conventional morality need not be a tool of oppression, but, when it is, the
alternative is the project of reestablishing a moral order, rid of moral para-
sites. Conventional moralists will object to such tactics by those whose cause
is just as debasing; it would seem as though the moral line between the just
and the unjust disappears. I think that the analysis of the breakdown of
conventional morality provided by the Gītā and modeled in the Mahābhārata
shows that this is mistaken; when it comes to such a just war, the convention-
al standards are now corrupt and cannot be used to judge the just. It would
hence be wrong to assume that, if the just adopt techniques of the unjust, they
hence fail at jus in bello. For instance, if Nazis attempt to use rights of free
expression afforded by conventional moralities to protect their own hate
speech or displays of racial hatred, by the display of fascist symbols, for
instance, to the effect of inciting fear in racial minorities or Jews, it would
not, on this argument, be wrong for antifascists to intimidate Nazis or punch
or silence Nazis at random, whereas it would be wrong for Nazis to engage in
such threatening behavior to attempt to defend themselves or even to be
Nazis. The tactics of antifascists find justification in the Gītā. Of course, on
standard conventional morality, including those of liberal societies, such tac-
tics would be ruled out of bounds.
The Mahābhārata and the Gītā as they relate to just war have been
discussed in the literature,6 as have wider approaches to the question of just
war in Indian literature.7 My approach is distinct from the standard approach
to talking about Indian thought in general.8 I recommend that reading philos-
ophy is about isolating perspectives and that we treat each perspective P as
entailing a theory T about its controversial t claims and understanding the
concept t as what competing theories of T disagree about. For instance, to
read philosophy is to identify distinct perspectives in a dialectic or tract;
identify a perspective’s theory that entails all its claims about a topic, such as
ethics; and identify the common concept of ethics as what competing theo-
ries of ethics disagree about. This approach contrasts with interpretation,
which is explanation by way of what one takes to be true. In my preferred
approach, which I call explication, we can remain agnostic about all substan-
tive matters as we pursue research in philosophy.
One of the outcomes of explication is that we acknowledge that the vari-
ous uses of the term “dharma” in Indian thought serve to articulate theories
of dharma; the common concept of dharma is the Right or the Good; and,
moreover, if we apply this method to contemporary philosophy in the West-
ern tradition, we find that “ethics” has the same conceptual content. The
contrary unprincipled approach is to treat one’s perspective (and beliefs) as a
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frame to study Indian thought, and uses of terms, such as “dharma,” are
correlated with distinctions that we subjectively draw; this results in the
multiplication of meanings associated with “dharma” and the ubiquitous
claim that it is difficult to translate this term into English or any other lan-
guage.
In endorsing explication, we are in a position to understand the dialectic
of the Mahābhārata’s and the Gītā’s account of just war. The governing
moral theory is what we could call yoga (i.e., discipline) or bhakti (i.e.,
devotion). According to this theory, the right action is defined by a regulative
or procedural ideal (the Lord, defined by the characteristics of unconserva-
tism and self-governance, which in the story is the character Krishna), and
the good is the perfection of the practice of devotion to the ideal. Yoga not
only provides the moral standards and practice to reestablish a moral order
when conventional morality breaks down; it also reestablishes the moral
order by dissolving the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello;
what justifies action is this approximation to the regulative or procedural
ideal, and what makes it right is the same approximation.
In the next section, “The Great War and Its Background,” I provide de-
tails about the Mahābhārata that are relevant to our inquiry into just war
theory. In the third section, “Krishna’s Response,” I explicate Krishna’s ar-
gument, which outlines an approach to self-defense in troubled times. The
arguments here are frequently misunderstood. Krishna presents himself as
the procedural ideal of just action, and readers often are distracted by the
similarities between this case and theistic models of God offering advice and
commands. Yet Krishna in the Mahābhārata is not a disjointed voice from
the heavens, nor is Krishna merely a source of pithy, inspirational teachings.
Krishna, a character on the ground, provides strategic advice in light of
context-relative challenges in the Mahābhārata and systematic arguments in
the Gītā and plays the role as the protagonist’s charioteer, guiding the moral
heroes into battle. In the context of a work of literature, the Mahābhārata,
Krishna functions as the procedural ideal that allows us to navigate personal
interests in a world of hostility. The entire work is hence a literary explora-
tion of just war theory and yoga’s relevance in particular. One major distinc-
tion is that Krishna presents himself not as good (indeed, much of his argu-
ment is a criticism of goodness as morally explanatory, and Krishna explicit-
ly does bad things on purpose) but as right. Hence, following Krishna’s
example is not necessarily about doing what is good but rather a concern for
what is right. (Indeed, one of the outcomes of the just war under Krishna’s
guidance in the Mahābhārata is the open question of whether the outcome
was good, though it was right.) Because theology concerns the discourse on
theism and God, for the theist, is primarily good, Krishna’s proposed moral
significance cannot be reduced to theism or theology. Unlike dialogues of
Plato, where participants talk only philosophy, in this extended dialogue, we
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find characters acting out various parts of the story of just war. It is hence
relevant to a global study of just war theory. In this chapter, and the third
section, I only attempt to distil the argument; for the drama, one must read
the epic. In the fourth section, I consider and respond to objections, and, in
the fifth, I conclude.
Can all of this help us elucidate Hindu conceptions on ethics when enter-
ing war (jus ad bellum) and the rules when engaged in warfare (jus in bello)?
This question is loaded and wades into areas of scholarship that are slightly
beyond the scope of this chapter. For instance, the term “Hindu” was a term
coined by the British to label indigenous Indian religion, and it is coextensive
with the disagreements of philosophy.9 With due caution not to overgeneral-
ize the importance of this one argument to Hinduism, as such, it would not be
an understatement to note that the argument from the Gītā may be the most
influential argument on just war theory in the Indian tradition because the
Gītā (and the Mahābhārata of which it is part) itself is one of the more
influential and popular books of the Indian tradition (of late) and one of the
very few on just war within this set.
THE GREAT WAR AND ITS BACKGROUND
The Mahābhārata (the “Great” war of the “Bhāratas”) focuses on the fratrici-
dal tensions and all-out war of two groups of cousins with a common ances-
tor, Bhārata: the Pāndavas, numbering five, the most famous of these broth-
ers being Arjuna, all sons of Pāṇḍu, and the Kauravas, numerous, led by the
oldest brother, Duryodhana, all sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra. Dhṛtarāṣṭra, though older
than Pāṇḍu and hence first in line for the throne, was born blind and hence
sidelined in royal succession because it was reasoned that blindness would
prevent Dhṛtarāṣṭra from ruling. Pāṇḍu, it so happens, was the first to have a
son, Yudhiṣṭhira, rendering the throne all but certain to be passed down via
Pāṇḍu’s descendants. Yet Pāṇḍu dies prematurely, and Dhṛtarāṣṭra becomes
king as the only appropriate heir to the throne because the next generation are
still children.
As the sons of Pāṇḍu and Dhṛtarāṣṭra grow up, Pāṇḍu’s sons distinguish
themselves as excellent warriors and virtuous individuals, who are not with-
out their flaws. The Kauravas in contrast are less able in battle but mostly
without moral virtues or graces. The rivalry between the two sets of cousins
is ameliorated only by the Pāṇḍavas’ inclination to compromise and be defe-
rential to their cousins—this despite attempts on the Pāṇḍavas’ lives by the
Kauravas. Matters turn for the worse when the Pāndavas accept a challenge
to wager their freedom in a game of dice, rigged by the Kauravas. The
Pāṇḍavas seem unable to restrain themselves from participating in this fool-
ish exercise because it is consistent with conventional past times of the rich
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and famous. After losing everything and even wagering their common wife,
Draupadi, who is thereby publicly sexually harassed, their freedom is granted
back by the Dhṛtarāṣṭra (who cave into the lament of the Pāṇḍavas’ one
common wife, Draupadi). But, once the challenge of the wager—taking a
chance—is brought up again, the Pāṇḍavas lose everything (again) and must
subsequently spend fourteen years in exile and the final year incognito and, if
exposed, must repeat the fourteen years of exile. They complete the exile
successfully and return to reclaim their portion of the kingdom, at which
point the Kauravas refuse to allow the Pāṇḍavas any home area so that they
might eke out a livelihood as rulers. Despite repeated attempts by the
Pāṇḍavas at conciliation, mediated by their mutual cousin, Krishna, the Kau-
ravas adopt a position of hostility, forcing the Pāṇḍavas into a corner where
they have no choice but to fight. Alliances, loyalties, and obligations are
publicly reckoned and distinguished, and the two sides agree to fight it out on
a battlefield with their armies.
What is noteworthy about the scenario described in the Mahābhārata is
that the Pāṇḍavas, but for imprudent decisions, conform their actions to
standards of conventional moral expectations for people in their station and
caste—including rising to the occasion of risky public challenges, as is the
lot of warriors. Ever attempting both compromise and conciliation, their
imprudent decisions are not the reason for their predicament, but rather the
hostility of the Kauravas is the explanation. But for this hostility, exemplified
by the rigged game of dice and the high-stakes challenge the Kauravas set,
the Pāṇḍavas would have lived a peaceful existence and would never have
been the authors of their own misfortune.
With all attempts at conciliation dashed by the Kauravas’ greed and hos-
tility, war is a fait accompli. Krishna agrees to be Arjuna’s charioteer in the
faithful battle, which will not only pit the Pāṇḍavas against the Kauravas but
also the Pāṇḍavas against kin who fight on the side of the Kauravas for
reasons of professional loyalty and not because of any sympathy for the
Kauravas’ plight. Indeed, to all who have any sense, the calamity that is to
occur is a result of the Kauravas, who managed to pursue their program of
aggression in part because of the Pāṇḍavas’ commitment to moral standards
of conciliation and compromise.
Arjuna laments the conditions that have brought him to this point. The
details of the oncoming war are especially tragic. Arjuna and his four broth-
ers (all sons of Pāṇḍu and thereby called the “Pāṇḍavas”) were unjustly
cheated out of their kingdom by their sociopathic cousins (the Kauravas), and
the Pāṇḍavas had sought every diplomatic means of resolving the tension
that would allow them to live the remainder of their lives peacefully. They
initially sought the restoration of their entire wealth but later were willing to
settle for a modest five villages to eke out a living. War was made inevitable
not by the Pāṇḍavas’ refusal to compromise, lack of deference, and willing-
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ness to make peace but by the Kauravas’ tyrannical unwillingness to make
peace. What makes the impending war especially tragic is that the Pāṇḍavas
are faced with the challenge of fighting not only tyrannical relatives that they
could not care less for; they must also fight loved ones and well-wishers,
who, through obligations that arise out of patronage and professional loyalty
to the throne, must fight with the tyrants. Bhīṣma, the grand-uncle of the
Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas and an invincible warrior (gifted or cursed with
the freedom to choose when he will die), is an example of one such well-
wisher. He repudiated the motives of the Kauravas and sympathized with the
Pāṇḍavas, but because of an oath that preceded the birth of his tyrannical
grandnephews (the Kauravas), he remained loyal to the throne on which the
Kauravas’ father, Dhṛtarāshtra, presided. Arjuna, who looked upon Bhīṣma
and others like him as loving elders, had to subsequently fight him. The
conflict and tender feelings between these parties was on display when,
before the war, Arjuna’s eldest brother, Yudhiṣṭhira, wanted the blessings of
Bhīṣma on the battlefield to commence the war and Bhīṣma, his enemy and
leader of the opposing army, blessed him with victory.10
Before the commencement of the battle, on the very battlefield with ar-
mies lined up in opposition and with Krishna as his charioteer, Arjuna loses
heart and entertains three arguments against fighting.
First, if he were to fight the war, it would result in death and destruction
on both sides, including the death of loved ones. Even if he succeeds, there
would be no joy in victory because his family would largely have been
decimated as a function of the war.11 This is a consequentialist and, more
specifically, utilitarian argument. Consequentialism is the theory that the
ends justify the means. Utilitarianism is the version of consequentialism that
holds that agent-neutral ends, such as the maximization of happiness or the
minimization of pain, justify our actions. In the Indian tradition, the source of
such arguments could be Buddhists, who are known for a consequentialist
ethics,12 or perhaps proponents of the Nyāya tradition.13 Regardless of the
cultural origins, according to utilitarianism, the right thing to do is justified
by some agent-neutral good (harm reduction or the maximization of happi-
ness), and, here, Arjuna’s reasoning is that he should skip fighting to ensure
the good of avoiding harm. It is worth noting that this argument on the basis
of utilitarianism pans out only if fighting ends up making things worse; if
war were the means to maximize happiness or minimize suffering, utilitar-
ianism would justify war. In the case of the Mahābhārata, luck has it that the
Pāṇḍavas are fewer in number than the Kauravas, and so it would seem that
giving into the Kauravas would make more people happy and simply avoid
the bloodshed and pain of war.
Second, if the battle is between good and evil, Arjuna’s character is not
that of the evil ones (the Kauravas), yet fighting a war would make him no
better than his adversaries.14 This is a virtue ethical argument. According to
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such arguments, the right thing to do is the result of a good, the virtues, or
strength of character. In the Western tradition, virtue ethics is associated with
Plato and Aristotle, who did not reason that war was unnecessary, and Plato
in the Republic reasoned that a class of people in an ideal community are
needed to wage war, namely, the guardians. In the Indian tradition, the think-
ers who were the likely source of this virtue theoretic argument were the
Jains, who regarded all action, especially and including action in deference to
one’s own physical interests, as wrong because such action further buries
one’s own virtue in practical schemes that run counter to the innate benign
character of persons.15 The idea that fighting evil renders oneself debased
and evil (and that passivism is the appropriate response to evil) has a firm
basis in Jain moral theory. The argument also resonates with the Christian
idea in the Gospel of Matthew that the proper alternative to a retaliatory
approach to offense is to turn the other cheek.
Third, war results in lawlessness, which undermines the virtue and safety
of women and children (Gītā, 1.41). This might be understood as an elabora-
tion of the first consequentialist argument: not only does war end in suffer-
ing, which should be avoided, but it also leads to undermining the personal
safety of women and children and, because their safety is good, we ought to
avoid war to protect it. But the argument can also be understood as a version
of Kantian-style deontology.
An essential feature of deontology is the identification of goods, whether
they are actions (i.e., duties) or freedoms (i.e., rights), as being what require
justification on procedural grounds. A duty is hence not only something that
is good to do and a right is not only something good to have, but one we have
reason to do or allow. Such goods, duties, and rights constitute the social
fabric and are justified (as Kant reasoned) in so far as they help us relate to
each other in a kingdom of ends. Deontology is hence the inverse of conse-
quentialism; whereas consequentialism holds that the good outcome justifies
the procedure, the deontologist holds that some good state of affairs (i.e.,
actions and freedoms) are justified by a procedural consideration. But what
consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics have in common is the idea
that the good (i.e., the valuable outcome) is an essential feature of making
sense of the right (thing to do). Morality defined or explained by way of the
good is something that can be established as an outcome of reality and hence
conventionalized. Thinking about morality by way of the good helps us
identify an area of moral reasoning we might call conventional morality:
actions motivated by good character (virtue ethics), good actions that we
have good reason to do (deontology), and actions that are justified in so far as
they promise to maximize the good as such (consequentialism).
What is surprising hence is that all of Arjuna’s arguments against war
make use of the good, and the theories he relies on fill out the content of what
we could call conventional morality. According to conventional morality, we
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should do what is inspired by the virtues, avoid causing harm, and affirm the
importance of good rules of interaction, whether they be characterized as
rights or duties. War disrupts conventional morality as Arjuna laments. And
this is indeed tragic in so far as conventional morality is organized around the
good.
But there is indeed another side to the story, which Arjuna does not see
and the Mahābhārata renders clear. It was conventional morality that made it
possible for the Kauravas to exercise their hostility against the Pāṇḍavas by
restricting and constraining the Pāṇḍavas. The Pāṇḍavas could have rid
themselves of the Kauravas by killing them at any number of earlier times
when they had the chance in times of peace, and everyone who survived
would have been better off for having been rid of moral parasites as rulers
and having the benevolent Pāṇḍavas instead. They could have accomplished
this most easily by assassinating the Kauravas in secret or perhaps openly in
public when they were not expecting it because the Kauravas never worried
about nor protected themselves from such a threat, owing to the virtue of the
Pāṇḍavas, whom they counted on. And yet the Pāṇḍavas’ fidelity to conven-
tional morality created a context for the Kauravas to ply their trade of deceit
and hostility. The game of dice that snared the Pāṇḍavas is a metaphor for
conventional morality itself: a social practice justified by prospects of a good
outcome (consequentialism), organized around good rules that make the par-
ticipation of all possible (deontology), and actions that follow from the cou-
rage and strength of its participants (virtue ethics).
The lesson of the Mahābhārata generalizes; conventional morality places
constraints on people who are conventionally moral, and this enables the
maleficence of those who act to undermine conventional morality by under-
mining those who bind themselves with it. Call the latter, who use conven-
tional morality as a weapon against the conventionally moral, moral para-
sites (Kauravas) and the former, who are happy to be bound by conventional
morality, moral conventionalists (Pāṇḍavas). The moral parasite is someone
who, for instance, wishes you to be honest and to abide by conventions of
transparency so they can steal from you. The moral parasite is someone who,
for instance, wishes for you to behave in a manner that is courteous, kind,
and accommodating so they can assault you, without resistance. The only
way to end this relationship of parasitism is for the conventionally moral to
give up on conventional morality and engage moral parasites in war. This
would be a just war—dharmyaṃ yuddham—and the essence of a just war
because the cause would be to rid the world of moral parasites. Yet, from the
perspective of conventional morality, which encourages mutually accommo-
dating behavior, this departure is wrong and bad. Indeed, relying purely on
conventional standards that encourage social interaction for the promise of a
good, an argument for pacifism is more easily constructed than an argument
for war.
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McMahan, from the perspective of the authors of the Gītā and
Mahābhārata, is correct for noting that there is an important moral distinc-
tion to be drawn between those who fight for a just cause and those who do
not. We might even note that the thrust of the argument from the Gītā agrees
that those who fight for a just cause do no wrong but those who fight for an
unjust cause are not morally equal to those who fight for a just cause—it is in
an important sense wrong for them to fight the war. The liability requirement
of discrimination, which holds that combatants must intentionally attack only
those who are legitimate targets, is often thought to mark out jus in bello for
all parties, and legitimate targets are often thought to be restricted to enemy
combatants, clearly marked out from third parties, such as civilians. As
McMahan notes, it is not at all clear how this applies to those who fight for
an unjust cause because the injustice of the cause should undermine the
propriety of attacking enemy (just) combatants. From the perspective of the
Gītā, we could also agree to his conclusion that “the traditional criterion of
liability to attack in war [from the West]—posing a threat to others—is
unacceptable.”16 Everyone poses a threat to others in so far as we all stand in
each other’s way. He further elaborates:
As I have presented it, the alternative conception of innocence is that one is
innocent if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong. While
the classical just war theorists focused on guilt, I think we should focus instead
on moral responsibility. It is, I think, a mistake to suppose that noninnocence
in the sense of moral guilt or culpability is necessary for liability to attack in
war. Something less is sufficient: namely, moral responsibility for a wrong,
particularly an objectively unjustified threat of harm. . . . [P]osing an objec-
tively unjustified threat is not sufficient for liability in the absence of moral
responsibility for that threat. In short, the criterion of liability to attack in war
is moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat of harm. 17
What the Gītā and Mahābhārata show, however, is that this threshold is too
high. Moral parasites do something objectively wrong by being moral para-
sites, but the wrong is much less than a threat of harm; it is merely the
imposition of conventional moral standards on others as a means of hostility.
It is difficult to characterize this as an objectively unjustified threat of harm if
one endorses conventional morality because moral conventionalists are para-
doxically committed to agreeing to this imposition because they have their
own reasons for endorsing it. That a thief desires us to be honest, for in-
stance, does not undermine our reasons for being honest, and, for us, honesty
may continue to be the best policy, even though it is in the advantage of the
parasite.
In the Mahābhārata itself, it is most important that Krishna, the adviser of
the Pāṇḍavas, steps in as their representative when they return from their
exile and pursues peace and compromise to its logical extent. Krishna at-
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tempts to broker that the Pāṇḍavas should be given five villages for them to
live in so that they can each sustain themselves as professional rulers of these
communities. The Kauravas refuse, though they only took hold of the land in
trust while the Pāṇḍavas were in exile. But now a new set of conventions has
been created, with the Kauravas in charge of everything, and it is the imposi-
tion of this convention that constitutes the Kauravas’ final assault as moral
parasites. In this case, it is difficult for the Pāṇḍavas to see the move as an
imposition of conventional morality (because it excludes them), and perhaps
for this reason the Pāṇḍavas are inclined to fight. But the real reason war is
inevitable is not for lack of conciliation on the part of the Pāṇḍavas but by
virtue of the parasitism of the Kauravas.
KRISHNA’S RESPONSE
To recap, the Mahābhārata depicts just war as arising at the breakdown of
conventional morality, between those who would protect and abide by such
constraints and against those who would not. Before this breakdown, there is
indeed a clear line that separates the innocent from the evil; not only is one
side justified in its cause, but its conduct is creditable too, whereas the other
side is not justified in its cause, and its conduct is discreditable. But, after the
breakdown of conventional morality, when the virtuous are no longer willing
to be constrained by the virtues themselves and are willing to engage in
conduct outside the bounds of conventional morality and are hence motivated
to engage in war, it is paradoxical to draw lines in the sand between sides; the
Mahābhārata’s stress on the familial drama, which pits well-wishers against
well-wishers, illustrates this point.18 War might be right and hence just, but it
is difficult to argue that it is good. The evil of war is shown by the desire of
combatants in a war not for endless war (something we wish to preserve or
maximize) but for victory, which is a good and also the cessation of war. So
those who are committed to engaging in battle are hence not committed to
the goodness of war but to its end. This shows that to transition from conven-
tional morality to war is to leave the good as an organizing principle and to
engage in an activity that is bad but also conventionally bad—with the dis-
tant hope of a good. In facilitating an understanding of the etiology of a just
war, the Mahābhārata at once allows us to understand the moral distinction
between those who fight justly (i.e., moral conventionalists) and those who
do not (i.e., moral parasites), and yet the war that ensues constitutes a depar-
ture from the standards that would allow us to draw sides. And, whereas
McMahan19 argued that the moral considerations that exist before war are
exactly those that allow us to understand the justice of one side during war,
the Mahābhārata appears to deny this because the conventional moral con-
siderations are structured around the good and war is crucially a bad thing
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characterized by several evils. Indeed, Arjuna’s three arguments against war
reviewed above—his consequentialist argument,20 virtue ethical argument,21
and deontological argument22—show the evil of war. Krishna’s argument in
response does not refute that war is bad: it trades on deflating the relevance
of the good to rational deliberation.
Krishna’s argument in the Gītā that concludes that Arjuna should fight his
war and that such a war would be just provides a purely procedural approach
to moral theorizing that does not involve or rely upon the good in any deep
way. This allows Krishna to mark out a different set of moral considerations
that survive the breakdown of conventional morality, which does depend on
the good. This approach allows us to distinguish whose conduct and cause is
just in war from those whose conduct and causes are unjust.
The first procedural ethic he defends is a form of deontology he calls
karma yoga, the discipline of action. Action is itself purposeful, and the
discipline of action is a practice of perfecting purposeful action. The argu-
ment is delivered generally as an argument for correct action in the face of
uncertainty: no matter who you are, something counts as your duty, and the
perfection of this duty is itself a good that relieves one from trouble.23 More-
over, all people who uphold a transcendental moral order (including Krishna,
who is depicted here as the Lord—the procedural ideal of right action, which
in its essence is both unconservatism and self-governance) participate in this
moral order by doing their duty. Krishna too, the procedural ideal, must
participate in dutiful behavior, and the Lord’s duties include lokasaṃgraha
(the maintenance of the welfare of the world)24 and to reestablish the moral
order when it declines.25 Whereas deontology can be part of a conventional-
ized picture of morality, karma yoga abstracts from conventional morality.
One’s duty can continue even at the breakdown of conventional moral expec-
tations structured around the good because it is justified not by the good but
by procedural considerations. But, as the reward of such behavior is duty
itself, moral parasitism is limited in its capacity to treat one’s own conscien-
tious behavior as a tool of its hostility.
The next step is bhakti yoga, the discipline of devotion. Here, right action
is defined by its conformity to a regulative ideal—Krishna himself—and, in
doing what is right, we sacrifice a concern for the outcome as a means of
worshipping the procedural ideal. This same theory is found elsewhere, artic-
ulated more clearly in the Yoga Sūtra; it is the moral theory of yoga (disci-
pline) or bhakti.26 According to this account, right action is defined by a
procedural ideal—unconservatism and self-governance—and perfecting our
practice of the right is the good. This theory differs from deontology in an
important respect. Whereas deontology treats our duty as itself a good, jus-
tified by procedural considerations only, in yoga/bhakti, the right is defined
by a procedural ideal, and hence we do not need to understand our moral
practice in terms of the good.27 In contrast to virtue ethics, consequentialism,
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and deontology, it alone accounts for morality without recourse to the good.
The good is not a primitive notion, here, but one definable by way of the
perfection of the right. So, whereas conventional morality is structured
around the good, bhakti dispenses with the good.
A third moral practice that Krishna recommends is jñāna yoga: the disci-
pline of thoughtfulness or knowledge. Jñāna yoga is the critical appreciation
of the framework of moral action, which complements karma yoga’s dis-
interest in trying to understand action as justified by outcome. It is the meta-
ethical component of the shift away from conventional morality to a fully
procedural approach to ethics. The essential element in this recipe is a move
to thinking about morality in purely procedural terms, which cuts out the
good as a primitive concept. This allows those who engage in just war,
against moral parasites, to have a moral compass that is not that of conven-
tional morality, which they had to leave behind to fight. Moreover, the moral
compass of yoga—discipline, or proceduralism—is timeless in so far as we
can understand its importance, even within the context of the breakdown of
conventional morality.
In the moral framework of yoga, there is a way to clearly identify the jus
ad bellum of just war. Previously we identified the just cause as the cause of
ridding the world of moral parasites. This is reworked into a positive doctrine
with yoga: our cause is just when we are devoted to the regulative ideal of
unconservatism and self-governance and our conduct is thereby just; it is
thereby not possible to have just conduct without a just cause. But this is a
winning strategy in war because it involves giving up on conventional moral-
ity and engaging in belligerent action outside of the scope of convention but
is also contrary to those who would attempt to constrain our potential. Moral
parasites are deprived of their favored weapon, but this is a side effect of our
own devotion to the Lord: unconservatism and self-governance. This re-
quires that we follow the dialectic of Krishna, which begins with deontology
but ends with the recommendation that we do not worry about morality,
merely devotion to the procedural ideal (Gītā, 18:66). This seems paradoxi-
cal, but the paradox disappears when we appreciate that the moral standards
we give up are conventional, tied to the good, and the one we embrace is
ideal, tied to the regulative ideal.
The argument we find in the Gītā provides us a way to understand the
logic of self-defense. The idea that we have a right to defend ourselves
against aggression is widely acknowledged. But for pacifists, who take the
stand that we should turn the other cheek, most would regard it as within our
rights and perhaps even a requirement of justice that we defend ourselves
against aggression, especially if this aggression is itself a departure from
conventional morality, unprovoked or unjustified. Yet it is difficult to square
with conventional moral expectation. Harming others does not follow from
the conventional moral virtues; it is not a good end that could justify morality
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(unless one’s idea of morality is sadism), and harming others is not a conven-
tional moral duty. Yet this is what self-defense entails. It would seem that
one’s aggressor’s departure from conventional morality, by adopting an ag-
gressive or threatening posture, is what apparently justifies one’s own depar-
ture from conventional expectations. And yet, so described, the right that we
have to meet such hostility in kind assumes that we have departed the moral
parameters of conventional morality. But now it appears that we have left
behind the tools we would need to justify our actions. This is the predicament
of the Pāṇḍavas against the Kauravas. Krishna’s arguments for devotion
provide the matrix for making sense of self-defense: it is a mere function of
our devotion to unconservatism and self-governance and requires no permis-
sion or blessing from conventional morality. To talk about it as a right—a
good freedom that we should protect—is to use the language of convention
to capture something whose justification transcends the good. However, this
procedural ideal—the Lord—is not proprietary but something we share as a
governing interest as people who have an interest in their own unconserva-
tism and self-governance. The ideal is something that we can organize and
rally around as common cause. Parasites concerned only with their own good
do not aspire to this common just cause and are instead tied to their vision of
the good.
OBJECTIONS
One objection to the argument for a procedural approach to just war theory is
that it not only licenses self-defense but apparently also preemptive meas-
ures. If we were to appreciate the motive of a party as moral parasitism, it
would apparently be proper for us to confront, intimidate, or do away with
such parasites, even if they had yet to break a moral convention and especial-
ly to prevent them from violating moral expectations. This seems like a
problem if we understand just war by way of conventional morality. But, as
noted, war does away with that. Moreover, intimidating and marginalizing
moral parasites is part of the very moral procedure of devotion to unconser-
vatism and self-governance, and, in so far as this can allow us to identify the
just side in a conflict and to distinguish it from the moral parasites, we have
no reason to object. The moral parasites, unlike the moral conventionalists,
are motivated by the subjective goods of their hostility: their advantage. The
moral conventionalist who takes up a procedural ethic is instead devoted in
general to procedural considerations in morality. This suggests hence that the
best just war is one where there is virtually little or no fighting; as in matters
of health, the best measures would be preventive. This too seems strange if
we adopt the posture of conventional morality but proper if we are procedu-
ralists.
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Consider also the case of anticolonial freedom fighters, who in the case of
India or perhaps the civil rights movement in the United States, adopted
tactics of unconservatism and self-governance that crippled conventional
moral expectations as a means of deflating the power of moral parasites, such
as British imperialists and racist policymakers of the United States. Gandhi is
famous for his reliance on the Bhagavad Gītā for inspiration for his struggle.
What is often not noted is that he drew inspiration and theory from the Yoga
Sūtra,28 which not only articulates the radical procedural approach to moral-
ity (yoga and bhakti) but also prescribes civil disobedience as a means of
dealing with moral parasites.29 M. L. King for his part was deeply influenced
by the political theorizing of Gandhi, and he applied the same strategy in the
US context. In the literature, citizen protests against hate groups and progres-
sive political movements of liberation against colonialist or racist oppression
are not treated as cases of war. Consider for instance Virginia Held’s list of
differing kinds of war: “world wars, small wars, civil wars, revolutions, and
wars of liberation.” Her comment that “terrorism resembles a small war”30 is
a characterization that excludes bloodless, nonviolent social confrontation.
For any of these to be just, according to the considerations of the Gītā, they
must involve a devotion to the regulative ideal, but then the justice of war is
not to be measured in terms of casualties but in terms of the cause.
A second objection might be that the yogic or procedural approach to just
war theory cannot explain the continuity of conflict in many areas of the
world because surely some sides in these conflicts are just, and they should
be far more successful if they manage to uproot the target of just war—moral
parasites—by leaving aside conventional morality. The obvious response is
that in most cases of sustained and perpetual conflict it is not clear whether
any side has an uncontroversially just cause because all sides are tied to
conventional morality to some measure. Each wishes their vision of the
goods of morality to be imposed on the other, and this desire to impose such
standards is an act of aggression. Such a mutual imposition might character-
ize a cold war or an active war of violence. Such wars are difficult to termi-
nate because no side is motivated to revise the moral order but merely to
sustain their vision of it.
A third objection is that just war understood as a procedural affair, as the
Gītā describes it, licenses preemptive strikes that are unjustified. We might
consider George W. Bush’s bombing and takeover of Iraq on the (fabricated)
supposed threat of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein could be
described as a moral parasite who wanted to inflict a certain conventionalized
vision on others for personal gain, and so it would have seemed just for the
United States to attack Iraq. Yet this is widely regarded as a failure and
hardly the paradigm case of a just war. Such scenarios of unjust preemptive
strikes fail an important procedural test: unconservatism and self-governance
as a procedural ideal that defines the right prevents us from thinking about
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campaigns as motivated by some good (say getting rid of Saddam Hussain)
but rather fidelity to the regulative ideal. Hence, unjust preemptive strikes
will fail to be just because they are motivated by some perceived good, such
as the imposition of democracy, riddance of a perceived threat, or the rooting
out of a dictator. The just cause is one that we can make sense of independent
of threats. The Allied campaign against the Axis powers in WWII stands in
sharp contrast. Here, the war was a function of the Allies’ practice of reestab-
lishing their own unconservatism and self-governance and thereby was just.
In this case, the Axis powers had assumed a hostile position not only with
respect to their own citizens (as in the case of Germany’s persecution of its
own minorities) but also with respect to their neighbors. The Allied interven-
tion to disarm this hostility and put an end to the persecution of minorities
was hence required to reestablish unconservatism and self-governance in
general and the unconservatism and self-governance of the Allies. In the case
of the Triple Entente versus the Triple Alliance in WWI, the origins of the
war and cause of justice is murkier. Had either side sought to inculcate
unconservatism and self-governance among all combatants, their cause
would be just. The harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles that the
French and British (of the Triple Entente) imposed on Germany (of the
Triple Alliance) were punitive; they demanded an admission of German guilt
for the war, and reparations undermined the cause of the Triple Entente
because it rendered punishing the Germans the goal of the war, not the
reestablishment of unconservatism and self-governance. That German resent-
ment could lead to another world war is unsurprising; it was a function of a
failure to resolve the war justly. The earlier annexation of the Balkan states
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thought to
have motivated the Serbian nationalists to assassinate the Austro-Hungarian
Archduke Ferdinand and commonly thought to be the start of WWI, consti-
tuted the imposition of a moral convention on a population that did not ask
for it. This was an unjust action that tainted the cause of the Triple Alliance.
India’s forceful reclamation of Goa from Portuguese rule (1961) was just;
the Portuguese as colonizers were participating in the breakdown of conven-
tional morality by the imposition of their laws as a means of controlling the
local population. Portuguese control of Goa was hence unjust, and the Portu-
guese were hence not justified in resisting Indian takeover, which had the
effect of returning local South Asian control to Goa. India’s military interces-
sion in Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan (1971) was similarly justified;
West Pakistan’s violent attempt to wrest control of East Bengal, after a
history of marginalization and imperial rule from the west, not only justified
Bangladesh’s break but also India’s intercession on behalf of the breakaway
East Bengal to establish unconservatism and self-governance for all con-
cerned.
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CONCLUSION
A famous Indian argument for jus ad bellum and jus in bello is presented in
literary form in the Mahābhārata; it involves events and dynamics between
two groups, moral conventionalists and moral parasites, that come to a head
in the fateful battle, which the Bhagavad Gītā precedes. Arjuna’s own lament
is an internalization of the logic of conventional moral expectations that
allowed moral parasitism, and Krishna’s push for a purely procedural ap-
proach to moral reasoning that, in its radical form, does away with the good
as a primitive of explanation provides the moral considerations that allow us
to see that the jus ad bellum and jus in bello coincide. The just cause is the
approximation to the procedural ideal, which is also just conduct. Hence,
McMahan31 would be correct in claiming that it is wrong for the unjust to
attack the just. But it is also not obviously correct that it is the same set of
moral considerations in war and peace that mark out the sides because peace
is largely characterizable by conventional morality, which all are forced to
abandon in war. Walzer32 is correct that there are different sets of standards
at play at war and peace and that getting hands dirty in immorality is a price
worth paying in war,33 but Walzer is thereby incorrect for a subtle reason:
conventional standards by way of which jus ad bellum and jus in bello appear
corrupt are themselves actually corrupt when the need for a just war arises. It
is because moral parasites use conventional morality as a means of hostility
and not as a means of fair, inclusive social interaction that conventional
morality is corrupted and turned into a tool of the unjust. It is hence unjust to
employ these standards to judge those whose cause is just, though such a
judgment is conventional. In no way does jus in bello that breaks convention-
al moral standards lessen jus ad bellum. And indeed, the departure from
conventional morality by those whose cause is just is decisive in undermin-
ing the cause of the unjust. Certainly, those who fight for a just cause thereby
justly get their hands dirty by departing from conventional moral standards.
But this is to the disadvantage of parasites who can function only in a climate
where the conventionally good are constrained by conventional morality.
Just war so understood deprives parasites of their weapon of choice. Just war
thereby succeeds by the just imposing on the unjust the cruelties, disadvan-
tages, or inconveniences rendered impossible by conventional morality.
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